The federal funding agencies periodically issue some form of communication, guidance,
new regulations or policies related to dealing with the issue of undue foreign influences
on research integrity. Below you will find a list of source documents from each agency
or organization.
National Institutes of Health [NIH]
In August 2018, Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Francis Collins
issued a Foreign Influence Letter to Grantees and testified to the Senate Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee regarding concerns about systematic programs
of foreign influence in U.S. research.
NIH Director Collins Dear Colleague Foreign Influence Letter
In December 2018 and June 2019, the NIH Advisory Committee to the Director (ACD) released
a report entitled ACD Working Group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity identifying
recommendations around communication and awareness; risk mitigation; and monitoring,
actions, and consequences.
NIH Advisory Committee to the Director Foreign Influence Report June 2019
NIH Advisory Committee to the Director Foreign Influence Report December 2018
Reminders of NIH Policies on Other Support and on Policies related to Financial Conflicts
of Interest and Foreign Components NOT-OD-19-114 July 10, 2019
Frequently Asked Questions Other Support and Foreign Components Initial Posting: June
19, 2019
National Science Foundation [NSF]
NSF Commissioned JASON Report
NSF commissioned the report to enhance the agency’s understanding of the threats to
basic research posed by foreign governments that have taken actions that violate the
principles of scientific ethics and research integrity. With the official receipt
of the report, NSF will now begin the process of analyzing its findings and recommendations.
NEWS ALERT: US National Science Foundation reveals first details on foreign-influence
investigations [NEW July 2020] https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02051-8
“The US National Science Foundation (NSF) has for the first time released figures
on the actions it has taken against researchers found to have violated rules on the
disclosure of foreign ties. Since 2018, the agency has reassigned, suspended or terminated
grants, forced institutions to return funds or barred researchers from applying for
future funding in 16–20 cases in which rules weren’t followed, according to Rebecca
Keiser, the agency’s first chief of research security strategy and policy. All of
these were cases in which the NSF’s Office of Inspector General, an independent body
responsible for oversight of the agency and its grant recipients, had investigated
and made recommendations on how to handle sanctions. Separately, the inspector-general
referred an undisclosed number of criminal and civil cases involving fraud and nondisclosure
to the US Department of Justice. Furthermore, in the past two months, seven universities
have contacted the NSF directly with information on faculty members who might have
violated rules.”
NSF- Statement of The National Science Board on Security and Science October 23, 2018
NSB-2018-42
Proposal & Award Policies & Procedures Guide January 2020
NSF Dear Colleague Research Protection Letter 7.11.19
The NSF Dear Colleague letter outlined a few steps it is taking to mitigate the risks
in concert with other agencies and stakeholders. Highlights from the letter:
- Citizenship Requirements
- To ensure that NSF is applying consistent standards to all staff members, each of
whom has access to sensitive merit review and other information, we issued a requirement
in April 2018 that rotators working onsite at NSF must be U.S. citizens or have applied
for U.S. citizenship.
- Disclosure Requirements
- Since 1978, NSF has required senior project personnel on proposals to disclose all
sources of support, both foreign and domestic.
- Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide
- A renewed effort is now underway to ensure that existing requirements to disclose
current and pending support information are known, understood, and followed.
- For example, in May, we published in the Federal Register a proposed clarification
of our proposal disclosure requirements (open for public comment through July 29).
Our draft NSF Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide includes clarifications
regarding reporting requirements for both current and pending support and professional
appointments.
- To streamline the process for providing these disclosures to NSF, we are proposing
use of an electronic format for submission of biographical sketches, including disclosure
of all appointments. As currently envisioned, this will become effective in January
2020. We are also working to develop an electronic format for disclosure of current
and pending support information.
- Foreign Government Talent Programs
- Finally, we are issuing a policy making it clear that NSF personnel and IPAs detailed
to NSF cannot participate in foreign government talent recruitment programs. There
is a risk that participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs by
NSF personnel and IPAs will compromise the ethical principles that bind us. Moreover,
such participation poses significant risks of inappropriate foreign influence on NSF
policies, programs, and priorities, including the integrity of NSF's merit review
process—risks we simply cannot accept.
Department of Energy [DOE]
DOE Directive O 486.1A, Foreign Government Sponsored or Affiliated Activities September 4, 2020
To ensure the continued flow of scientific and technical information consistent with
the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad scientific mission, while also ensuring protection
of U.S. competitive and national security interests and DOE program objectives; preventing
potential conflicts of interest, e.g., financial interests, conflicts of commitment,
and outside employment, which may undermine the DOE research enterprise; and limiting
unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information. Cancels DOE O 486.1,
dated 6-7-2019.
Science Article on DOE Policies February 8, 2019
DOE Directive regarding Foreign Government Talent Recruitment, June 7, 2019
DOE Order 486.1: "To ensure the continued flow of scientific and technical information
consistent with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) broad scientific mission, while also
ensuring protection of U.S. competitive and national security interests and DOE program
objectives; and limiting unauthorized transfers of scientific and technical information."
Department of Defense [DOD]
Department of Defense Letter raising awareness of efforts to combat foreign influences
on research integrity. The letter highlights the efforts of JCORE - Joint Committee
on the Research Environment
"In his September 16, 2019. letter to the research community. Dr. Kelvin Droegemeier,
Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), described
a new OSTP-led interagency Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE).
DoD is an active participant in JCORE, and in its sub-committee on Research Security,
which is initially focused on coordinating four lines of Federal effort:
- coordinating outreach and engagement
- disclosure requirements for participation in federally funded research
- best practices for academic research institutions
- methods for identification, assessment, and management of risk
This work will help agencies that fund Federal research to develop common standards
for identifying and adjudicating conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment
from these disclosures. It will also help agencies that fund Federal research to clarify
consequences for failing to make these disclosures."
Department of State [DOS]
The State Department has issued a new determination under the Foreign Missions Act,
requiring members of the Chinese diplomatic corps to notify the State Department when
making visits to educational and research institutions, among other entities.
The Department’s determination requires U.S.-based personnel of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign missions
(including personnel at the embassy and consulates of the PRC and those on temporary
assignments conducting official business for the PRC government) to notify the State
Department’s Office of Foreign Missions in advance of:
- Official visits to educational institutions
- Official visits to research institutions, including National Labs
- Official meetings with state officials
- Official meetings with local and municipal officials
Chinese diplomats only need to inform the Department of these types of meetings. They
do not need the State Department’s permission to visit educational institutions. The
State Department indicated that the PRC government has chosen to prevent American
diplomats from gaining access to Chinese campuses for educational and cultural programming,
including programs that encourage students to study at American educational institutions.
The new policy for PRC officials is a result of this situation.
NYT Article Under New Rule, Chinese Diplomats Must Notify State Dept. of Meetings
in U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA]
“NASA is restricted by specific applications of Section 1340(a) of The Department
of Defense and Full-Year Appropriations Act, Public Law 112-10 (NASA's 2011 continuing
resolution), and Section 539 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriation
Act of 2012, Public Law 112-55 (NASA's FY 2012 appropriation) from using funding appropriated
in the Acts to enter into or fund any grant or cooperative agreement of any kind to
participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company, at the prime recipient level or at any subrecipient level, whether the bilateral
involvement is funded or performed under a no-exchange of funds arrangement.”